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By way of a survey among 80 Dutch administrative law judges, this paper uses 
principal-agent theory, as well as contextual factors, to explain judicial assistants’ 
influence on adjudication. Principal-agent theory has, thus far, been applied mainly 
to the setting of the US Supreme Court—to test the hypothesis that judicial assis-
tants influence justices’ decisions less, as the political attitudes of assistants and 
justices differ more. To create a more universal theory to explain judicial assistants’ 
influence, we have derived five other hypotheses from principal-agent theory, which 
can also be used to explain judicial assistants’ influence in other court  settings. 
As expected, we find that judges’ managerial role orientation, trust in judicial 
 assistants and favourable risk-benefit perception of assistants’ input increase assis-
tants’ influence. Contrary to our expectations, we did not find judges’ rule of 
law role orientation and relative experience of assistants to be correlated with 
 assistants’ influence. Likewise, none of the contextual factors—panel judgments 
(vs. single-judge judgments), complexity of court cases and time pressure—are cor-
related with assistants’ influence. While three perceived risks of defection explain 
the influence that judges allow assistants, contextual factors do not. As such, our 
study shows that—when operationalised differently—principal-agent theory can be 
fruitfully applied to settings apart from the politicised US Supreme Court.
Keywords: judicial assistants; judicial decision-making; principal-agent theory; 
risk benefit perception; trustworthiness
Introduction
Recently, academic attention has been directed toward the collegial feature of judicial deci-
sion-making.1 The literature on the influence of colleagues on judicial-decision-making, 
however, predominantly focuses on the role of judge-colleagues. Other co-workers of judges 
—namely, the judicial assistants that assist judges in preparing and processing cases—have 
 * Erasmus University Rotterdam, NL, mascini@essb.eur.nl
 † Erasmus University Rotterdam, NL, holvast@law.eur.nl
 1 See L. Baum, Court colleagues, the public and the other branches of government, in: L. Baum, Judges and Their 
Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior, Princeton University Press 2006, pp. 50–87; H. Edwards, The Effects 
of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151 (5) pp. 1639–1690. The 
collegiality facet is also essential to strategic models of judicial decision-making, see L. Epstein & J. Knight, The 
Choices Judges Make, CQ Press, Washington DC 1998; L. Epstein & T. Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial 
Decisions, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 6, pp. 341–358. 
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received more limited attention. This is especially true for judicial assistants at lower courts. 
This oversight is surprising, since in many jurisdictions both the number of judicial assistants 
and the duties assigned to them have increased.2
The rising prevalence and prominence of ‘judicial assistants’, or simply ‘assistants,’ has 
increased the urgency around better understanding their role in the judicial decision-making 
process. An obvious point of attention, in studies on judicial assistants, is the level of influ-
ence that they wield.3 Explaining assistants’ influence on adjudication is an important follow-
up focus point, which is explored in this article.
Most of the research that goes beyond a mere description of the role of judicial assistants 
originates from the US, with a strong emphasis on law clerks at the US Supreme Court.4 The 
majority of these explanatory studies use a version of principal-agent theory that is adapted 
to the specific setting of the US Supreme Court (see more on principal-agent theory in the 
next section). In this setting, assistants are appointed to assist one justice, with whom they 
work closely. The clerkship is a temporary position, usually lasting one year. Decision-making 
at the court is, furthermore, highly politicised. The studies using principal-agent theory to 
explain assistants’ influence, in this specific setting, focus particularly on justices’ selection 
of assistants as a tool to control adverse selection and on the congruence of the political atti-
tudes between assistants and justices. These studies’ findings cannot simply be generalised 
to other levels of court and other judiciaries—precisely because of the exceptional conditions 
of assistant-justice collaboration in the US Supreme Court. Moreover, a small body of mostly 
qualitative studies suggests that principal-agent theory is altogether insufficient to explain 
the role of assistants in judicial decision-making. These studies indicate that contextual fac-
tors—such as whether a case is decided upon by a single judge or a panel of judges, the com-
plexity of court cases, and time pressure—also explain assistants’ influence on adjudication.
For both reasons, our goal is to provide an alternative explanatory model to understand 
judicial assistants’ influence on adjudication. To achieve this goal, we develop and test a ver-
sion of principal-agent theory that can be applied more universally than the one that has 
been used thus far. Additionally, we test the explanatory power of several contextual factors. 
The data used for this research were collected from a survey of administrative law judges 
at Dutch district courts. Apart from the theoretical aim to contextualize and enrich princi-
pal-agent theory for the explanation of judicial assistants’ influence, our study also aims to 
provide insights that are relevant for legal practice. There is a general awareness that the 
involvement of judicial assistants in adjudication can have advantages such as reducing case-
loads and backlogs, relieving judges of routine, administrative tasks enabling them to focus 
their attention on the more complex aspects of adjudicating and providing a soundboard for 
judges. At the same time there are also concerns that employing assistants may have disad-
vantages such as a diminishing judge’s sense of personal responsibility for judgments and 
an abdication of judicial responsibilities. This study increases the insight into the conditions 
under which assistants influence judges’ decisions and what strategies judges use to control 
the risks of involving assistants in adjudication in addition to selecting assistants.
 2 See, on the US, e.g.: A. Ward & D. L. Weiden, Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States 
Supreme Court, New York University Press, New York 2006; T. C. Peppers, M. W. Giles & B. Tainer-Parkins, Inside 
Judicial Chambers: How Federal District Court Judges Select and Use their Law Clerks. Albany Law Review 7(1) 
pp. 353–370 and J.S. Rosenthal & A. H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the Supreme Court. Cornell Law 
Review 96 pp. 1307–1344. Regarding courts in Europe, see N. L. Holvast, In the Shadow of the Judge: The Involve-
ment of Judicial Assistants in Dutch District Courts, Eleven International publishing, The Hague 2017, section 1.1. 
 3 See, e.g.: N.L. Holvast & P. Mascini Is the Judge or the Clerk Making the Decision? Measuring the Influence of 
Judicial Assistants via an Experimental Survey among Dutch District Court Judges. International Journal for 
Court Administration 11(3) pp. XX–XX.
 4 For some of the most influential studies, see T. C. Peppers, Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of 
the Supreme Court Law Clerk, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2006 and Ward & Weiden, supra note 2.
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In the next section, we provide our hypotheses. Subsequently, we explain the method of 
our study. We then present our findings and discuss them. In the last section we draw our 
conclusion.
Hypotheses regarding the influence of judicial assistants
Principal-agent theory, operationalised in terms of attitudinal differences
While several more descriptive and qualitative studies exist on the role and duties of judicial 
assistants in a wide range of jurisdictions,5 the quantitative studies that attempt to explain 
influence are predominantly US centred, with a strong bias towards the US Supreme Court. 
The dominant theory used in these studies is principal-agent theory.6
Principal-agent theory applies in circumstances where one actor (the ‘agent’), is able to 
make decisions on behalf of, or that impact, another actor (the ‘principal’).7 These circum-
stances create a dilemma when the two actors may have different interests and asymmetric 
information (the agent having more information), such that the principal cannot directly 
ensure that the agent is always acting in the principal’s best interest. This is particularly true 
when activities that are useful to the principal are costly to the agent, and where elements of 
what the agent does are costly for the principal to observe.8 Various mechanisms may be used 
to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. A distinction is made between 
two types of control mechanisms.9 The first type is related to adverse selection, that is when 
the agent has private information about the costs of exerting effort or the valuation of a 
good before an employee contract is concluded. An example of this type of control mecha-
nism is the selection of new recruits who are likely to share the principal’s interests. The 
 5 See, e.g., on the Supreme Court in Canada: L. M. Sossin, The Sounds of Silence: Law Clerks, Policy Making, and 
the Supreme Court of Canada. University of British Columbia Law Review 30 pp. 279–308 and F. L. Morton 
& R. Knopff, The Role of Clerks in the Supreme Court of Canada, in: F. L. Morton (ed.), Law, Politics, and the 
Judicial Process in Canada, University of Calgary Press, Calgary 2002, pp. 555–559; on German Federal Courts: 
J. Wieland, The Role of the Legal Assistants at the German Federal Constitutional Court, in: R. Rogowski & T. 
 Gawron (eds.), Constitutional Courts in Comparison: The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court,  Bergbahn Books, New York 2002, pp. 197–207; O. Massing, The Legal Assistants at the German 
Federal Constitutional Court: A ‘Black Box’ of Research? A Comment, in: R. Rogowski & T. Gawron (eds.) Consti-
tutional Courts in Comparison: The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court,  Bergbahn 
Books, New York 2002, pp. 206–216; on Dutch district courts: Holvast, supra note 2; on the Norwegian Supreme 
Court: G. Grendstad, W. R. Shaffer, J. Øyrehagen Sunde & E. N. Waltenburg, Proactive and Powerful: Law Clerks and 
the Institutionalization of the Norwegian Supreme Court, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague 2020; on 
the UK Supreme Court: A. Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court, Hart  Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2013, pp. 247–257.
 6 This theory is used in studies by Peppers, supra note 5; Ward & Weiden, supra note 2; R. C. Black & C. L. Boyd, 
The Role of Law Clerks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-setting Process. American Politics Research 40(1) pp. 
147–173; C. Ditslear & L. Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Journal 
of Politics 63 pp. 869–885; R.A. Swanson & S. L. Wasby, Good Stewards: Law Clerk Influence in State High Courts. 
The Justice System Journal 29(1) p. 33; P. J. Wahlbeck, J.F. Spriggs & L. Sigelman, Ghostwriters on the court? 
A  Stylistic analysis of U.S. Supreme Court opinion drafts. American Politics Research 30(2) pp. 166–192; T. C. 
Peppers & C. Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment. DePaul 
Law Review 58 pp. 51–78; Rosenthal & Yoon, supra note 2; C. D. Kromphardt, Fielding an Excellent Team: Law 
Clerk Selection and Chambers Structure at the U.S. Supreme Court. Marquette Law Review 98(1) pp. 289–311; 
A. Bonica, A. Chilton, J. Goldin, K. Rozema & M. Sen, Legal Rasputins? Law Clerk Influence on Voting at the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 35(1) pp. 1–36. See also S.J. Kenney, S. J. Beyond prin-
cipals and agents: Seeing courts as organizations by comparing référenaires at the European Court of Justice and 
law clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court. Comparative Political Studies, 2000, 33(5) pp. 593–625, on referendaires at 
the European Court of Justice.
 7 K.M. Eisenhardt (1989) Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management Review 14 (1): 
57–74.
 8 L. Bebchuk & J. Fried (2004) Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press.
 9 J-J. Laffont & D. Martimort (2002) The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.
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second type of control mechanisms pertains to moral hazards, wherein the agent becomes 
privately informed after an employee contract is concluded. Examples of this type of control 
mechanisms are monitoring and incentivizing performances.
Judges, as principles, employ clerks—their agents—to help them cope with their workloads 
by performing particular duties, such as writing first drafts of opinions. However, the delega-
tion of duties also enables clerks to ‘develop private information that would allow them to 
steer decisions in a particular direction’.10 The principal must therefore ‘be concerned about 
potential avoidance of duty or shirking on the part of the agent, which can arise when there 
is a divergence between the preferences of the two’.11 This means that judges may want to 
reap the benefits of involving assistants in judicial decision-making, while at the same time 
controlling the risks of assistant defection or underperformance. As is typical of principals, 
judges basically face two risks: adverse selection—which could result in recruiting untrustwor-
thy assistants—and moral hazard, which could result in collaborating with assistants that do 
not share the same goals as the judge.
The most important tools that contemporary Supreme Court justices possess to reduce the 
possibility of assistant defection are on-the-job monitoring of the assistants’ performance 
and selection. It is the latter tool that has been extensively studied. Ditslear and Baum have 
established that justices endeavour to select clerks that share their ideological preference 
and that this trend has become stronger during the last few decades.12 Subsequently, Peppers 
and Zorn13 have additionally established that justices’ inclination to select like-minded clerks 
influences justices’ decisions regarding their merits. The probability of a liberal vote by jus-
tices in the US Supreme Court increases, as the cadre of judicial clerks is composed of more 
Democrats than Republicans. Apart from replicating the latter finding, Kromphardt has estab-
lished, more specifically, that justices are less likely to cast a liberal vote when their chamber 
is composed homogenously of conservative clerks.14 Furthermore, two studies have shown 
that ideological differences between clerks and judges play a role when it comes to screen-
ing certiorari petitions for Supreme Court hearings.15 Clerks prepare memoranda regarding 
these petitions in a pool; the memos are distributed amongst the chambers of all justices in 
the pool. The ideological distance between the pool clerks and pool justices impacts judges’ 
votes. Both studies show that receiving a clerks’ recommendation from an ideological oppo-
nent, versus from a trusted ally, makes a judge less likely to vote consistently with the clerk’s 
recommendation. However, in the study of Black and Boyd,16 this is found to be true only for 
those petitions that are of middle-high quality (not for petitions of low or high quality).
In these American studies, the control issues that justices face as principals are thus con-
sistently narrowed down to political-ideological divisions, which justices attempt to solve via 
their selection strategies. This specific operationalisation of principal-agent theory is particu-
larly suitable for the setting of the US Supreme Court. The focus on selection mechanisms is 
logical, given that the justices typically select their personal clerks annually and nearly always 
personally interview the final candidates.17 Justices’ hiring choices can therefore massively 
decrease the risk of defection by personal clerks. Focusing on ideological differences and 
 10 See Peppers & Zorn, supra note 6, p. 58, citing Wahlbeck et al., supra note 7.
 11 See Black & Boyd, supra note 6, p. 151.
 12 See Ditslear & Baum, supra note 6.
 13 See Peppers & Zorn, supra note 6.
 14 C. D. Kromphardt, US Supreme Court Law Clerks as Information Sources. Journal of Law and Courts 3(2) 
pp. 277–304.
 15 See Black & Boyd, supra note 6; R. C. Black, C. L. Boyd & A. C. Bryan, Revisiting the Influence of Law Clerks on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-setting Process. Marquette Law Review 98(1) pp. 75–109.
 16 Black & Boyd, supra note 6, p. 163.
 17 See Peppers & Zorn, supra note 6, p. 59.
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partisanship also makes perfectly good sense in the context of the US Supreme Court. The US 
Supreme Court is highly politicised, given the political nature of the court cases it decides. 
The process of appointing the justices themselves (after nomination by the US president) 
also considers the justices’ political attitudes and partisanship as important selection criteria. 
Researchers suggest that the court has become increasingly politicised during the last dec-
ades.18 The setting of the US Supreme Court is quite unique. This implies that the dominant 
operationalisation of principal-agent theory, therein, is not necessarily similarly suitable for 
other settings. In fact, there are reasons to assume that such an operationalisation is unsuit-
able for most other court settings.
First, the focus on clerk selection is not obvious for most other court settings. In many 
settings, judges are not as involved in selecting the assistants. Also, several courts have dif-
ferent set-ups, in which judicial assistants are not appointed to individual judges. For exam-
ple, many US courts also employ so-called ‘staff-attorneys’. These are professional, centralised 
research staff members who routinely serve for multiple years. An inventory among member 
states of the Council of Europe also reveals that, in the majority of European member states, 
a judicial assistant position can be a permanent career.19 Additionally, a substantial number of 
member states organise judicial assistance so that assistants are assigned to panels of judges, 
or work in a pool for multiple judges.20 This implies that, in comparison to the setting of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the relationship between judges and assistants is less personal and the 
personal selection criteria of judges (for instance, related to their political preferences) play a 
much smaller role in the selection of assistants.
Second, in most court settings apart from the US Supreme Court, the influence of partisan-
ship and political attitudes upon judges is likely to be limited. ‘This is because judges have 
an incentive to protect the legitimacy of their institutions, and judicial legitimacy is thought 
to suffer when partisanship is seen as a basis for the court’s decisions’.21 Indeed, research 
has shown that ideology plays a smaller role in hiring judicial clerks at the lower court lev-
els (circuit court and district court).22 Two surveys—among federal district court judges and 
federal court of appeal judges, respectively—showed that only 15.1% of district court judges 
and 15.8% of appellate court judges mentioned political ideology to be a factor in hiring 
law clerks. Consecutively, 0.3% of district court judges and 1.7% of appellate court judges 
considered political ideology to be the most or the second most important selection crite-
rion, respectively. This was a much lower priority level than they gave to judicial assistants’ 
personalities and law school class ranking.23 In line with the previous observations, legal spe-
cialisation—rather than political orientation—was found to be the most important selection 
criterion for selecting judicial assistants at the German Constitutional Court.24 Thus, there 
is ample research indicating that judicial clerks’ political attitudes do not have a significant 
impact on judicial decision-making in settings apart from the U.S. Supreme Court.
 18 A. Ward, Law Clerks, in: L. Epstein & S.A. Lindquist (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2017, pp. 100–125; R.A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term: A Political Court, 
 Harvard Law Review 119 pp. 31–102; J. Segal & H. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, 
Cambridge University Press, New York 2002.
 19 CCJE Opinion No. 22 (2019), p. 10.
 20 CCJE Opinion No. 22 (2019), p. 11.
 21 J. D’Elia-Kueper & J. A. Segal, Ideology and partisanship. In Oxford Handbook of Judicial Behavior, ed. L Epstein, 
S Lindquist, pp. 303–319. New York: Oxford Univ. Press 2017, p. 308. See also R. A. Posner, The Judge as Labor 
Market Participant, in: How Judges Think, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London 2008, pp. 57–77 and 
Edwards, supra note 2, p. 1682.
 22 Bonica et al. supra note 6, p. 122; D’Elia—Kueper & Segal, supra note 21, p. 305. 
 23 Peppers, Giles & Tainer-Parkins, supra note 2; T. C. Peppers, M. W. Giles & B. Tainer-Parkins, Surgeons or Scribes? 
The Role of United States Court of Appeals Law Clerks in Appellate Triage. Marquette Law Review 98 pp. 313–332.
 24 See Wieland, supra note 5.
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This does not mean, though, that principal-agent theory cannot provide a valuable expla-
nation of judicial assistants’ influence on judicial decision-making. On the contrary, a more 
universally operationalised version of the theory is still expected to offer a powerful explana-
tion. First, the distinction between principal and agent seems suitable to characterise the 
relationship between the judge and the judicial assistant. After all, as judges are the ones 
appointed by law to adjudicate, they are ultimately responsible for the opinions and judg-
ments. Judicial assistants are subordinates and all their duties derive from the judges’ respon-
sibility to adjudicate. Second, the basic assumption that underlies principal-agent theory—that 
judges seek to benefit from the involvement of assistants in judicial decision-making, while at 
the same time controlling the risk of assistant defection—appears realistic. However, whereas 
clerks’ incompatible political attitudes are deemed to pose a significant risk for justices in the 
US Supreme Court, they are unlikely to be perceived as such by judges in most other court 
settings. The latter are likely to perceive other vulnerabilities in collaborating with judicial 
assistants. We therefore proceed by identifying five other factors that determine the magni-
tude of the moral hazard judges face when involving assistants in judicial decision-making, 
which also account for courts apart from the US Supreme Court.
Factors determining the magnitude of the moral hazard of employing judicial assistants
The first factor that may guide judges’ decision-making behaviour and how they deal with 
employing judicial assistants consists of their role orientations. Whereas the attitudinal model 
of the principal-agent theory focuses on controlling the content of judicial decision-making 
(Democratic/liberal vs. Republican/conservative views on what is considered a proper out-
come of adjudication), role orientations are concerned with the process of decision-making. 
Role orientations concern a judge’s conception of what is considered to be proper decision-
making behaviour by a judge.25 Focussing on the process of decision-making, Gibson notes 
that judges can have ‘narrow’ or ‘broad’ role orientations. ‘Narrow’ orientations reject the 
legitimacy of allowing anything but strictly legal criteria to influence judicial decision-
making. ‘Broad’ orientations are more open to allowing non-legal criteria in the process of 
decision-making.
A new development among Western judiciaries has been observed, which may change 
judges’ role orientation. A paradigm of managerialism has been introduced into court organi-
sations, which alters the thinking around adjudication.26 This development also offers judges 
a new set of values toward which to orientate their judicial behaviour. In the managerial 
paradigm, private-sector principles and techniques are applied to the court organisation. 
Non-legal criteria, such as effectiveness and efficiency and accountability, are thus also con-
sidered to legitimise judicial decision-making. Differentiation of duties and the creation of 
internal stratification are important ways in which administering justice can be organised 
more efficiently. Judicial assistants can play a key role in achieving greater efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness. This perspective thus marks the desirability of involving subordinate staff 
members, such as judicial assistants, in judicial decision-making. As such, the managerial 
 25 J.L. Gibson, Judges’ Role Orientations, Attitudes and Decisions: An Interactive Model. American Political Science 
Review 72, pp. 911–24. 
 26 E. Mak, The European Judicial Organisation in a New Paradigm: The Influence of Principles of New  Public 
 Management on the Organisation of the European Courts. European Law Journal 14(6) pp. 718–734; M. 
 Noordegraaf, Hybrid professionalism and beyond: (New) Forms of public professionalism in changing organiza-
tional and societal contexts, Journal of Profession and Organization, 2(2) pp. 187–206; P. M. Langbroek & M. R. M. 
Westenberg. Court administration and quality work in judiciaries in Four European countries. Empirical explora-
tion and constitutional implications. Bern: Stämpfli Verlag 2018; M. Visser, R. Schouteten & J. Dikkers, Controlling 
the Courts: New Public Management and the Dutch Judiciary, Justice System Journal 40(1) pp. 39–53. 
Peter Mascini and Nina L. Holvast Art. 15, page 7 of 18
perspective results in broader ideas around judicial decision-making than were present when 
courts were led by the traditional rule of law paradigm.
Within a rule of law paradigm, judges are—to a certain degree—viewed as being the personifi-
cation of the judiciary, one of the three independent branches of the government. To carry out 
their special duty of administering justice, judges are surrounded by several unique safeguards 
that aim to uphold their independence: impartiality, integrity and competence. These provi-
sions justify that judges are entrusted by society with the responsibility to adjudicate. Holvast 
argues that this rule of law paradigm means that involvement in adjudicational duties by non-
judges, such as judicial assistants (who are not surrounded with comparable safeguards), is 
likely to be perceived as inappropriate or at least problematic.27 A particular concern of del-
egating duties to judicial assistants, from a rule of law role orientation, is that judges will 
sacrifice at least part of their autonomy to make a fully independent and impartial decision.28
Judges may have internalised either of these two prevailing normative stances toward the 
employment of judicial assistants. A managerial role orientation is less restrictive than a rule 
of law role orientation, in terms of allowing other than strictly legal criteria to influence judi-
cial decision-making. Therefore, it is expected that judges who have internalised the former 
role orientation allow assistants more influence than do those who have internalised the 
latter role orientation.
It is also conceivable that judges’ perceptions of the risks and benefits of employing assis-
tants have an effect on assistants’ influence on adjudication—one that is independent of 
judges’ role orientation. Judges may, on the one hand, perceive risks around involving assis-
tants in judicial decision-making, such as abdicating responsibilities for adjudication, gener-
ating extra tasks related to supervising assistants and corroding the authority of the judge. 
On the other hand, judges may perceive benefits. For example, the involvement of assistants 
can enable judges to delegate simple, time consuming tasks so they can focus on the more 
demanding, complex aspects of adjudication; can provide judges with a sounding board; and 
can help prepare hearings, opinions and verdicts. In relation to judges’ role orientations and 
their weighing of the risks and benefits of involving assistants in judicial decision-making, we 
formulate our first three hypotheses:
•	 A judge’s managerial role orientation is associated with the judicial assistant having more 
influence on the judge’s decisions (hypothesis 1);
•	 A judge’s rule of law role orientation is associated with the judicial assistant having less 
influence on the judge’s decisions (hypothesis 2);
•	 The more a judge is convinced that the benefits of involving assistants in the decision-
making process outweigh the risks of doing so, the more influence judicial assistants 
have on judges’ decisions (hypothesis 3).
Related to the weighing of risks and benefits is the amount of trust—or lack thereof—an assis-
tant deserves, in the eyes of the judge. Trust can be defined as the confidence that another 
party to an exchange will not exploit one’s vulnerability.29 In this context trust means that 
judges have confidence that assistants will not execute the duties that have been delegated 
to them in such a way that it harms the position or reputation of the judge. The level of trust 
of the judge in the assistant is another factor that can be expected to define the influence 
 27 See Holvast, supra note 2.
 28 J. M. Cohen, Inside Appellate Courts: The Impact of Court Organization on Judicial Decision Making in the United 
States Courts of Appeals, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Harbor 2002, p. 122.
 29 C.F. Sabel, Studied trust: Building new forms of cooperation in a volatile economy. Human Relations 46(9), 
p. 1133.
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of judicial assistants. Generally, three aspects of trust are distinguished: competence, benev-
olence and integrity.30 An ethnographic study in Dutch district courts showed that judges 
particularly referred to the former aspect of trust, in relation to their collaboration with judi-
cial assistants.31 Several judges mentioned relying more on certain judicial assistants than 
on others, because they generally ‘do a better job’ or are ‘better assistants’. Judges attributed 
these qualifications mainly to the educational background of judicial assistants and to their 
experience and expertise. A particular competency that was also regularly mentioned as an 
important factor, in trusting judicial assistants’ work, was their accuracy. Thus, in some situa-
tions, a judge’s expectation that an assistant is deserving of trust seems to play a role in how 
much influence assistants have on judge’s decisions.
This study also demonstrated that the extent to which judges appeared to rely on the com-
petency of assistants, depended not just on the competency of the assistant but also on that 
of the judge. Especially when a very experienced and knowledgeable assistant was working 
with a judge who was new to a specific field of law, this could result in judicial assistants 
dominating the decision-making.32 When a judge had little experience and the assistant had 
a great deal of experience, this resulted in the judicial assistant being particularly highly 
involved in adjudication. This suggests that the experience level of the judicial assistant, rela-
tive to that of the judge, appears to affect their influence.33 A US study also suggests that 
judges’ relative experience affects the influence of judicial assistants on judicial decision-
making.34 That research shows that newcomers to the court are systematically more likely 
to follow an assistant’s pool memo recommendation, than are their more senior colleagues.
Two hypotheses can be formulated based on the role of trust. The first of these focuses on 
the trustworthiness of the assistant and the second on the assistant’s relative competence:
•	 The more trust a judge places in a judicial assistant, the more influence this assistant has 
on the judge’s decisions (hypothesis 4);
•	 The more experience a judicial assistant has, relative to the judge, the more influence this 
judicial assistant has on the judge’s decisions (hypothesis 5).
Contextual explanations
So far, we have only discussed hypotheses that are derived from principal-agent theory. Yet a 
modest body of, primarily, qualitative studies suggests that contextual factors also play a role 
in assistants’ influence on adjudication. In our study we will assess how three contextual fac-
tors affect the influence of judicial assistants, but without formulating concrete hypotheses 
about their impact. The reason why we abstain from formulating hypotheses about these 
contextual factors is that the empirical evidence on how these factors are related to judicial 
decision-making is either insufficiently solid or inconclusive.35
The first factor concerns the composition of the adjudicating corps: are the cases adjudi-
cated by a single judge or a panel of judges? The suggestion that this factor may play a role 
in assistants’ influence is based on a study by Holvast. The majority of judicial assistants 
she interviewed mentioned that their involvement is usually greater during single-judge 
 30 R.C. Mayer, J.H. Davis & F.D. Schoorman, An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust. Academy of Management 
Review 20, pp. 709–734.
 31 See Holvast, supra note 2.
 32 Ibid.
 33 Ibid. 
 34 See Black & Boyd, supra note 6, p. 164. See also A. Yoon, Law Clerks and the Institutional Design of the Federal 
Judiciary, 98, Marq. Law Review 131, p. 147.
 35 See Holvast, supra note 2.
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decision-making than in cases that are decided upon by a panel of judges.36 In more com-
plex, single-judge cases, the judicial assistant regularly functions as an important discussion 
partner for the judge. In panel decision-making, the judges are frequently so engaged with 
each other that the opinion of the assistant is less relevant. This suggests that assistants have 
more influence in cases that are decided by a single judge than those that are decided by a 
panel of judges.
A second contextual factor that may determine the influence of assistants is the complexity 
of a court case. The findings with regard to this factor point in opposing directions. On the 
one hand, Holvast found that, in most instances, simple cases were decided primarily by fol-
lowing precedent.37 The outcome of these cases was rather clear-cut. Hence, neither the judge 
nor the judicial assistant really made a difference regarding the outcome of the judgment. 
In legally complex cases, there was more room for variable outcomes. This also resulted in 
more room for assistants to influence the judicial decision. This was especially true when the 
assistant had a great deal of expertise and the judge valued his or her opinion.
On the other hand, Holvast also found that more complex cases tended to receive greater 
attention from the involved judge(s), which seemed to diminish the assistants’ influence.38 
Yet, when Black and Boyd tested this hypothesis in their study on the influence of law clerks, 
they did not find support for it.39 There are other studies, though, which also question the 
idea that judges grant assistants more discretion in complex cases than they do in simple 
cases. For instance, Swanson and Wasby exposed that the higher the percentage of routine 
cases on the court’s docket (as perceived by the surveyed judges), the higher the percentage 
of cases in which a clerk changes the judge’s opinion.40 The researchers’ interpretation of this 
finding is that—in cases with clear-cut legal outcomes, where clerks provide highly constrain-
ing laws or facts that cannot be evaded—judges have no option but to change any precon-
ceived opinions to conform to the legally dictated result.
Thus, although several studies suggest that the complexity of court cases is associated 
with the influence of assistants, the empirical evidence is inconclusive about the direction of 
this association. The greater prevalence of precedents in simple cases may either reduce or 
enhance the room for assistants to influence judges’ decisions, while the increased attention 
that judges pay to complex cases may reduce assistants’ influence.
Time pressure is a third contextual factor that may affect the influence wielded by judicial 
assistants.41 Again, the available data on how this factor affects the influence of assistants 
points in different directions. On the one hand, Holvast found that judges had less time 
to discuss cases when they experienced time pressure, which could result in their deciding 
cases alone instead of discussing them with their judicial colleagues or assistants.42 On the 
one hand, she also found that, when judges were under pressure to produce output, they 
were occasionally more receptive to the input of judicial assistants and less critical regarding 
the products (such as draft-judgements) they created.43 This amplified receptivity increases 
judicial assistants’ potential to influence judicial decision-making. The effect appeared to 
be strengthened when judges were dealing with substantial workloads and were operat-
ing under severe time pressure. The suggestion that time pressure provides assistants more 
 36 Ibid.
 37 See Holvast, supra note 2.
 38 See Holvast, supra note 2.
 39 Black & Boyd, supra note 6, p. 164.
 40 Swanson & Wasby, supra note 6, p. 43.
 41 Yoon supra note 34, p. 132.
 42 See Holvast, supra note 2.
 43 See Holvast, supra note 2.
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influence was supported by a study from the US.44 This research established that—in state 
high courts without an intermediate court below them—law clerks were more influential in 
changing their judges’ opinions, regarding proper case outcomes, than in state high courts 
with an intermediate court below them. The researchers suggest that this reflects the typi-
cally larger workload placed on judges in former high courts, which could lead them to defer 
more often to clerk recommendations.
Thus, time pressure may reduce the assistants’ influence as it leaves judges less time to dis-
cuss the merits of cases, but it may also increase assistants’ influence because it makes judges 
more receptive for assistants’ suggestions on how to adjudicate.
We will compare the anecdotal or inconclusive findings of the existing research about the 
association between the composition of the adjudicating corps, case complexity and time-
pressure and assistants’ influence on adjudication with the findings of this study.
Method
Data
We tested our hypotheses in a research project conducted among Dutch district court judges 
working in Administrative Law. Dutch district courts handle all court cases in the first instance. 
This results in wide variations among cases (from very simple to highly complex), which are 
adjudicated under greatly differing circumstances. We limited our study to administrative law 
judges for practical reasons. The second author had the best contacts among judges within 
this legal domain, for instance, and administrative law judges are approached less often to 
participate in research than are criminal judges. Since judges have the ultimate responsibility 
for judgments, we focused on judges and did not include judicial assistants in our research.
In order to contextualize our explanatory model of assistants’ influence, we briefly discuss 
the role of judicial assistants in the Dutch court system in general and in administrative law 
cases in particular.45 In the Netherlands, judicial assistants are not assigned to specific judges. 
Rather, judicial assistance work in a pool for multiple judges. Since judicial assistants are not 
assigned to an individual judge, a large part of the selection and recruitment of assistants 
is completed by court managers rather than judges. Although the minimum educational 
requirement for new judicial assistants is a degree from an institute of higher professional 
education, most applicants possess a university law degree. Employment as a judicial assistant 
is not a temporary position; rather, it can be a lifelong career. Judicial assistants assist judges 
in cases from the beginning of the process up to the writing of the judgment. Administrative 
law assistants in particular perform all four duties through which they may influence judges’ 
decisions.46 These duties consist of screening, for example by deciding whether a court case 
will be send to a single judge or a panel of judges, deliberating cases with the judge, prepar-
ing bench memos and drafting judgments.
Our research data were collected by way of a survey, distributed among all Administrative 
Law judges working at Dutch district courts. Approval for the distribution of the survey was 
granted first by the Council of the Judiciary (Raad voor de rechtspraak) and subsequently by 
the National Board of Administrative Judges (Landelijk Overleg Vakinhoud Bestuursrecht). The 
survey consisted of five sections: 1) the perceived extent and desirability of a clerk’s influence 
on judicial decision-making, 2) the collaboration of the respondent with a clerk in a concrete 
court case, 3) the role orientation of the respondent, 4) background characteristics of the 
 44 Swanson & Wasby, supra note 6, p. 42.
 45 See N.L. Holvast (2016) The Power of the Judicial Assistant/Law Clerk: Looking Behind the Scenes at Courts in 
the United States, England and Wales, and The Netherlands. International Journal for Court Administration 7(2), 
pp. 10–27.
 46 See, Holvast & Mascini supra note 3.
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respondent and 5) a vignette of a fictitious but realistic court case. The first four sections are 
used for this paper, while the fifth part is used for another paper.47
In total 90 respondents filled-in the questionnaire. Ten questionnaires were deleted 
because they were only partly completed. At the start of our data collection, in total 272 
FTE were working as an administrative law judge, while on average judges work 0.925 FTE.48 
This means the response rate was approximately 27% (80/(272 x 1.081)). This rate is lower 
than the average response rate of 35.7 percent that Baruch and Holtom found for studies 
utilizing data from organizations, but it is within the range of one standard deviation of 
18.8 that they established in their study.49 A potential reason for our somewhat lower than 
average response percentage has been the process we had to follow in collecting the data. 
Data were collected in two rounds. Since we were not allowed to send individual judges an 
email-invitation to complete the online questionnaire for privacy reasons, we had to rely on 
team leaders to distribute this email among their team members.50 After two weeks, a sec-
ond email was distributed to remind judges to complete the questionnaire. The first round 
yielded 31 questionnaires that were filled in completely. In order to boost the response, we 
were granted permission by the National Board of Administrative Law Judges to conduct a 
second round of data collection in five of the eleven administrative law divisions of district 
courts in the Netherlands – Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Haarlem, Utrecht and Arnhem. During 
this second round we personally visited these courts to briefly present our research to the 
judges at team meetings, to answer possible questions about the questionnaire and to invite 
them to complete our questionnaire.51 Additionally, the team leader of administrative law 
judges in Zwolle offered to personally bring the questionnaire to the attention of his team 
members and collect and post the completed questionnaires to us. This second round of data 
collection increased the response substantially. However, as mentioned, only six out of eleven 
courts were included in the second round. Moreover, the second round brought to light that 
not all judges had received or read the email that was sent in the first round of data collection. 
Both factors may have negatively influenced the ultimate response rate.
It is challenging to assess how our selection procedure may have affected the generalizabil-
ity of our findings. It was not possible for us to determine which judges received the invita-
tion email in the first round, which results in us not being able to assess how this affected the 
representativeness of our sample. What we can say is that in comparison to the total popula-
tion of judges in the Dutch courts, the average age of the sample is similar (50.5 (population) 
vs 50.1 (sample) years), while males are overrepresented in the sample (36.9% (population) 
vs 51.4% (sample)).52 Judges working at the courts that we visited during the second round of 
data collection are also overrepresented in our sample. We are unable to determine whether 
the (lack of) representativeness of these different categories in our sample has had an impact 
on the test results of our hypotheses.
Measurement
The dependent variable was based on the influence that judges attribute to assistants in a 
concrete court case. Judges were asked to recall the latest court case, in which they collabo-
rated with a judicial assistant, and to report the extent to which the assistant had contributed 
 47 Holvast & Mascini, supra note 3.
 48 According to the judiciaries annual report over 2018.
 49 Y. Baruch & H.C. Brooks (2008) Survey Response Rate Levels and Trends in Organizational Research. Human 
 Relations 61(8): 1139–1160.
 50 The court administration could only provide us with the figure about the amount of FTE that was working as an 
administrative law district court judge at the time of our research. Total number of administrative law district 
court judges was unknown to the administration. 
 51 The judges could either fill-in the questionnaire online or on paper.
 52 Jaarverslag de rechtspraak 2018, Figure 1, p. 38, Table 7, p. 39.
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to the outcome of the court case. The answer categories were the following: 1) ‘none,’ 2) ‘very 
inconsiderable,’ 3) ‘inconsiderable,’ 4) ‘considerable,’ and 5) ‘very considerable.’ The court 
cases varied in content. They involved, for example, reuniting family members who have 
stayed in the country or origin with a family member who has migrated to a host country, 
real estate appraisal, the denial of social welfare payments and the licensing of electric vehicle 
charging posts.
Of the five variables that were used to test the principal-agent theory, a managerial role 
orientation emphasises—among other aspects—the values of efficiency and effectiveness in 
judicial decision-making. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they disagreed or 
agreed with five Likert items, with answers ranging from ‘disagree strongly’ to ‘agree strongly’, 
as well as a category of ‘don’t know/no opinion.’ Table 1 shows that the factor loadings of 
the five items range between 0.32 and 0.79, which together do not constitute a reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.51). As all items loaded sufficiently high on the underlying factor and no 
better alternative to measure the managerial role orientation was available, we have decided 
to use this scale nonetheless. This means that we test hypothesis 1 with an unreliable scale, 
an issue we return to in the discussion.
Scale scores were calculated as the mean score for every respondent having a valid score on 
at least three of the five items used to measure the managerial role orientation. Higher scores 
on this scale indicate that judges have internalised a managerial role orientation.
A rule of law role orientation centres, among other aspects, on the constitutional independ-
ence and impartiality of the judge. This orientation was measured with eight Likert-items, 
emphasising the value of the judge as autonomous decision-maker and the legal provisions 
that justify judges’ autonomy of decision-making. Table 2 shows that the factor loadings of 
the eight items range between 0.30 and 0.75 and together constitute a scale of relatively low 
but acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.64).53,54,55
 53 J.C. Nunnally & I.H. Bernstein (1994). Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.
 54 Reversed item.
 55 Reversed item.
Table 1: Principal Components Analysis of five Likert items indicating a managerial role 
orientation (N = 63).
Items Factor loadings
(1) The quality of judicial decisions suffers severely from court budgeting54 0.70
(2) Judges insufficiently take into account whether the costs of their efforts 
outweigh the benefits
0.65
(3) Judges ought to give better account of the time spent on handling cases 0.79
(4) It is undesirable that the budget of courts is dependent on the number of 
cases handled55
0.32
(5) Team leaders ought to conduct themselves more as managers 0.38
Eigenvalue 1.8
Variance explained (%) 35.5
Cronbach’s alpha 0.51
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Scale scores were calculated as the mean score for every respondent having a valid score on 
at least four of the eight items used to measure the rule of law role orientation. Higher scores 
on this scale indicate that judges have internalised a rule of law role orientation.56
Trust was measured based on the extent to which the judge believed that the particular 
judicial assistant they had collaborated with, in the concrete court case, possessed the quali-
ties of experience, assertiveness, precision, speed and orientation toward service. The answer-
ing categories ranged from: 1) To a very small extent, 2) To a small extent, 3) To some extent, 
4) To a large extent, 5) To a very large extent. Index scores were calculated by adding the 
scores for the five qualities and subsequently dividing the sum by five. A high score indicates 
that a judge puts a high level of trust in this assistant.
Assistants’ relative experience was measured by subtracting the standardised score for the 
respondents’ own experience as an administrative law judge, in years, from the standardised 
score for the experience they attributed to the judicial assistant they had collaborated with 
in the concrete case. The answer options were 1) very little, 2) little, 3) some, 4) much, 5) 
very much.
The risk-benefit perception of involving judicial assistants in the decision-making process was 
measured with ten Likert items. The answer categories ranged from ‘disagree strongly’ to ‘agree 
strongly’ and ‘don’t know/no opinion’. Table 3 shows that the factor-loadings of the ten items 
range from 0.34 to 0.74 and together constitute a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.70).
Scale scores were calculated as the mean score for every respondent having a valid score on 
at least nine of the ten items used to measure the risk-benefit perception. Higher scores on 
this scale indicate that respondents are more convinced that the benefits of involving assis-
tants in judicial decision-making outweigh the risks.
 56 Reversed item.
Table 2: Principal Components Analysis of eight Likert items indicating a rule of law role 
orientation (N = 49).
Items Factor loadings
(1) The selection procedure for judges needs to be stricter 0.46
(2) Judgments contain too much jargon56 0.40
(3) Politicians interfere too much with individual court cases 0.70
(4) Citizens lack the required knowledge to assess the correct value of  judicial 
decisions
0.62
(5) The council of the judiciary poses a threat to the independence of the judge 0.41
(6) Adjudication by laymen is undesirable, because it undermines the  quality of 
the judiciary
0.58
(7) The use of algorithms in judicial decision-making jeopardises the quality of 
the judiciary
0.68
(8) The approval of having ancillary positions in addition to being a judge 
ought to be restricted further
0.52
Eigenvalue 2.4
Variance explained (%) 29.7
Cronbach’s alpha 0.64
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The first of the three contextual factors consisted of whether the concrete court case in 
which the respondent had collaborated with a judicial assistant was decided by a single judge 
or by a panel of judges. The reported complexity of the case ranged from (with percentages 
given in brackets): 1. Very simple, 2. Simple, 3. Neither simple nor complex, 4. Complex, 5. 
Very complex. Time pressure was measured by asking respondents how much time they had 
at their disposal to solve the concrete case. The answer categories (with percentages given 
in brackets) were: 1) Much too little, 2) Too little, 3) Precisely enough, 4) Too much, 5) Way 
too much.575859606162
Results
Table 4 shows to what extent principal-agent theory and contextual factors explain judicial 
assistants’ influence, in a concrete court case in which the judge collaborated with a particu-
lar judicial assistant.
The five hypotheses are derived from principal-agent theory. In support of hypothesis 1, a 
managerial role orientation correlates positively with judicial assistants’ influence (r = 0.22, 
p < 0.05). This correlation remains significant when controlling for the other principal-agent 
factors (ß = 0.19, p < 0.05) and when also controlling for the contextual factors (ß = 0.23, p < 
0.05). The more judges emphasise the values related to managerialism in their role orientation, 
 57 Reversed item.
 58 Reversed item.
 59 Reversed item.
 60 Reversed item.
 61 Reversed item.
 62 Reversed item.
Table 3: Principal Components Analysis of ten Likert items indicating the risk-benefit per-
ception of involving judicial assistants in judicial decision-making (N = 75).
Items Factor loadings
The contribution of judicial assistants to judicial decision-making
(1) …provides an invaluable assistance to the judge 0.68
(2) …harms the reputation of the judiciary57 0.65
(3) …enables the judge to focus on his core tasks 0.40
(4) …dilutes the ultimate responsibility of the judge for decision-making58 0.47
(5) …relieves the judge 0.34
(6) …influences the outcome of the case in improper ways59 0.61
(7) …diminishes the authority of the judge60 0.74
(8) …keeps the judge on edge 0.43
(9) …causes the judge to pay less attention to the specific circumstances of a 
particular court case61
0.35




Variance explained (%) 29.3
Cronbach’s alpha 0.70
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the more influence they allow assistants in concrete court cases. Contrary to hypothesis 2, 
there is no significant correlation between a rule of law role orientation and assistants’ influ-
ence. A role orientation that emphasises values related to the rule of law does not prevent 
judges from allowing assistants’ influence (r = –0.01, p = n.s.; ß = 0.03, p = n.s. when control-
ling for other principal-agent factors and ß = 0.01, p = n.s. when controlling also for contextual 
factors). In support of hypothesis 3, there is a strong positive correlation between judges’ per-
ception that the benefits of involving assistants in judicial decision-making outweigh the risks, 
and assistants’ degree of influence (r = 0.45, p < 0.01). This correlation becomes substantially 
weaker when controlling for the other principal-agent factors, particularly trustworthiness. Yet 
it remains significant (ß = 0.23, p < 0.05), even when also controlling for the contextual factors 
(ß = 0.21, p < 0.05). In support of hypothesis 4, there is a strong positive correlation between 
judges’ trust in the particular assistant they are collaborating with in concrete court cases and 
said assistant’s influence (r = 0.62, p < 0.01). This correlation decreases, but remains signifi-
cant, when controlling for the other principal-agent factors (ß = 0.45, p < 0.01) and when also 
controlling for the contextual factors (ß = 0.43, p < 0.01). In support of hypothesis 5, there is a 
positive correlation between the experience of the judicial assistant, relative to the experience 
of the judge (r = 0.27, p < 0.05), and the assistant’s level of influence. Yet, this correlation is no 
longer significant when controlling for the other principal-agent factors (ß = 0.12, p = n.s.) and 
when controlling also for contextual factors (ß = 0.15, p = n.s.). Thus, it cannot be concluded 
that judges allow assistants more influence when assistants have more relative experience.6364
 63 M.H. Kutner, C.J. Nachtsheim & J. Neter (2004). Applied Linear Regression Models (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill Irwin.
 64 Sheather, Simon (2009). A modern approach to regression with R. New York, NY: Springer.
Table 4: Judicial assistants’ influence on a concrete court case explained by principal-agent 








Managerial role orientation (hyp. 1) 0.22* 0.19* – 0.23*
Rule of law role orientation (hyp. 2) –0.01 0.03 – 0.01
Perceived risk-benefit (hyp. 3) 0.45** 0.23* – 0.21*
Trust (hyp. 4) 0.62** 0.45** – 0.43**
Relative experience of assistant (hyp. 5) 0.27* 0.12 – 0.15
Contextual explanation
Panel judgment (vs. single-judge) 0.02 – 0.07 0.06
Complexity case –0.09 – –0.13 –0.12
Time pressure 0.00 – 0.09 0.12
R2% 44.3** 1.3 45.8**
# In model 1 all principal-agent variables are regressed on the assistants’ influence, in model 2 all 
contextual factors are regressed on the assistants’ influence, in model 3 both the principal-agent 
variables and the contextual factors are regressed on the assistants’ influence.
~ The variance inflation factor (VIF) for the variables in model 3 ranges between 1.19 (rule of law role 
orientation) and 1.70 (complexity court case), all below the rule of thumb that if VIF>10 then multi-
collinearity is high63 (a cutoff of 5 is also commonly used).64
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table 4 also presents the correlations between three contextual factors and assistants’ influ-
ence. None of these correlates are significant. Moreover, this lack of significance does not 
alter after controlling for other contextual factors and factors related to principal-agent the-
ory. The literature review already showed that multiple interpretations of contextual factors 
are possible and that relatively little previous research has been conducted, upon which to 
build solid hypotheses. It is possible that our measures were insufficiently specific to capture 
the complexities and nuances involved in these contextual factors.
This means that three out of the five hypotheses derived from principal-agent theory are 
supported by our findings, while none of the contextual factors are associated with assistants’ 
influence on adjudication. In total, 45.8% of the total variance is explained by the two sets 
of explanations.
Discussion
In this section, we first provide interpretations for not finding support for two principal-agent 
related hypotheses. Subsequently, we discuss the limitations of our study.
A reason for not finding that a rule of law role orientation is negatively correlated with judi-
cial assistants’ influence on judgments may be that the assumption on which this hypothesis 
is based is wrong. Contrary to this assumption, an orientation among judges that views their 
role as that of core adjudicators entrusted with the responsibility by law—and accompanied 
by unique safeguards to promote independence, impartiality, integrity and competence—
may not be incompatible with allowing assistants influence on judgments. It could be argued 
that—if assistants’ input is limited to administrative, supportive and consultative tasks and if 
judges remain ultimately responsible for judgments—then the legitimacy of adjudication is 
not compromised by the involvement of assistants in judicial decision-making. This argument 
becomes even stronger when judicial assistants also enjoy several safeguards similar to those 
of judges, such as adherence to a professional code of conduct and minimal requirements of 
training and expertise. It could thus be understood that a rule of law role orientation is not 
negatively correlated with assistants’ influence. The tenability of this interpretation could be 
explored, by probing deeper into how the category of judges that has firmly internalised a 
rule of law role orientation think about the (un)desirability of delegating certain tasks and 
responsibilities.
Furthermore—in line with our expectation regarding the hypothesis on relative experi-
ence—we find that the assistant’s experience, relative to the judge, is positively correlated 
with the assistant’s influence. However, contrary to our expectations, this correlation is no 
longer significant after controlling for the other factors that are linked to principal-agent 
theory (and contextual factors). This suggests that relative experience captures yet another 
aspect of the level of trust a judge places in an assistant. This would explain why relative expe-
rience ceases to correlate significantly with assistants’ influence when controlling for trust. 
This interpretation is also congruent with principal-agent theory, in that this theory predicts 
that assistants’ influence is positively correlated with trust—i.e., how slight the principal (the 
judge) perceives the risk of defection by the agent (the assistant) to be. Black, Boyd and Bryan 
also fail to find support for the relative experience hypothesis: Justices are not less likely to 
follow a pool clerk’s recommendations when they have served more time on the court.65
Our study has several methodological limitations. First, the number of valid observations, 
at 80, is rather small, just as is the response rate of around 27%. A higher response rate 
would have reduced the risk of potential biases. Second, we assessed the dependent variable 
 65 See Black, Boyd & Bryan, supra note 13, p. 98.
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using a single indicator (namely, the influence of judicial assistants in a concrete court case as 
perceived by the judge). This perceived influence may not accurately reflect assistants’ actual 
influence. Ideally, assistants’ actual influence should be measured by way of an experimental 
study, as we have done in another paper.66 However, it is challenging to devise an appropri-
ate experimental design for this particular study. This is because such an experimental study 
would require the comparison of judge’s decision with and without collaboration with a judi-
cial assistant on the same court case, which is not feasible. What is conceivable, is to increase 
the number of indicators measuring assistants’ perceived influence. For instance, respond-
ents could be asked to recall more than one court case in which they collaborated with a par-
ticular assistant and to attribute the amount of influence to assistants in each of these cases. 
Another option would be to supplement the influence a judge attributes to an assistant in a 
particular court case with the influence the assistant attributes to herself in the same case. 
Third, we encountered some challenges in measuring the judges’ role orientations. The reli-
ability of the managerial role orientation scale was not sufficient and the number of missing 
values, for some items measuring both role orientations, was considerable. This means that 
the validity of the measurement of both role orientations could be improved. These meth-
odological limitations to our study imply that our conclusion needs to be interpreted with 
some caution.
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to test the extent to which principal-agent theory and contextual 
factors explain judicial assistants’ influence on adjudication. Principal-agent theory has thus 
far been operationalised primarily in terms of congruence between the political attitudes of 
judges and assistants, to explain assistants’ influence on justices’ decisions in the US Supreme 
Court. We have derived five hypotheses from this theory, which can offer a more universal 
operationalisation that is better suited for explaining judicial assistants’ influence in a wide 
range of court settings. As expected, we find that three of the principal-agent hypotheses—
judges’ managerial role orientation, judges’ trust in judicial assistants and judges’ percep-
tion that the benefits of involving assistants in adjudication outweigh the risks—positively 
correlate with assistants’ influence in concrete court cases. Contrary to our expectations, we 
did not find the other two principal-agent hypotheses—judges’ rule of law role orientation 
and the experience of assistants relative to the experience of the judge—to be correlated 
with assistants’ influence. Likewise, none of the contextual factors—panel judgments (vs. 
single-judge judgments), complexity of court cases and time pressure—are correlated with 
assistants’ influence. Thus, while several of the hypotheses relating to principal-agent theory 
explain the influence that judges allow assistants, contextual factors do not. Our study shows 
that principal-agent theory can be fruitfully applied to settings other than the politicised 
US Supreme Court. It also shows that apart from the recruitment of suitable assistants, trust 
building is another strategy that judges use to control the risks of involving assistants in adju-
dication. By collaborating with specific assistants in daily practice, judges learn by experience 
which duties they can or cannot delegate safely. This insight provides an important nuance to 
more general discussions about the potential risks of involving assistants in adjudication. To 
determine whether contextual factors (as well as the principal-agent related hypotheses that 
were not found to be significant) can explain judicial assistants’ influence, further research is 
required. Replicating an expanded version of this study, in other legal domains and jurisdic-
tions, is therefore warranted.
 66 Holvast & Mascini See Holvast & Mascini supra note 3.
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